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Legal Comment
No tort of invasion of privacy
Alec Samuels
There is no tort of invasion of privacy Wainwright v Home Office (2003) 3 WLR 1137, HL.
Privacy may be invaded in so many ways, often but not necessarily always, morally and
ethically and socially unacceptably:
Disclosure of private personal medical matters.
Disclosure of intimate personal and family matters.
Unjustified strip search.
Intrusion into hospital room.
Photograph of conjoined twins; or cancer patient.
Surveillance device stuck on to the wall of the house.
"Bugging". Hidden camera.
Insurers' investigators.
Photography with long lens into private garden, owner swimming naked in her private
pool, or topless woman on private or secluded beach, causing embarrassment.
Publication of photograph (infra-red) of an unhappy man attempting suicide in a dark street
comer.
Non-consensual video and audio recording.
"Gatecrashing" a private wedding reception, taking and selling secret photographs of the
event.
Public disclosure of identity of adulterer by scorned and rejected mistress.
Public disclosure of fact that a particular identified person suffers from AIDS or is HIV
positive, e.g. spouse, lover, doctor.
Disclosure of infonnation revealing identity and location of released child killers, e.g. Mary
Bell, and Thompson and Venables.
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Reasons
The reasons given by the House of Lords for there being no tort are exactly what one
would expect from traditional English Judges:
There has been no judicial authority, certainly no clear line of cases from the higher courts.
Definition would present a real difficulty. A tort of privacy, however defined, would be
vague and uncertain and broad and general, difficult or impossible to apply in any given
case, unworkable, impracticable.
The need to protect freedom of expression and freedom of speech would mean that there
would need to be too many counterbalancing defences and exemptions in the public interest.
Judges may properly extend and develop and refine common law principles, and discretely
employ analogies, but they may not create entirely new laws. That is a legislative activity
for the legislature.
Parliament has not created a statutory tort of invasion of privacy and must be presumed to
be content that there is none.
In fact many specific statutory and common law remedies do exist to protect to some extent
the citizen in many particular circumstances of invasion of privacy:
Battery
Trespass to the person, trespass to property
Protection from Harassment Act 1997
Nuisance
Police Act 1997 (re surveillance)
Interception of Communications Act 1985 (re telephone tapping)
Breach of copyright
Trade secrets
Breach of confidence
Data Protection Act 1998
Malicious falsehood
Defamation
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Breach of privacy by a public authority entitles the citizen to go to the ECHR and obtain a
remedy under Article 8, requiring the United Kingdom government to alter the domestic
law if necessary in order to provide an effective remedy.
Unconvincing
It is submitted that these arguments are unconvincing in this century.
In an era of the recognition of human rights the autonomy and dignity of the citizen is
rightly accorded a high priority in the law.
That the many intrusions and abuses of privacy should go without a remedy is
unacceptable.
The existing statutory and common law remedies certainly cover some of the intrusions and
abuses, but by no means all.
The judges have always applied underlying values, justice, common sense, and have always
steadily developed remedies to meet developing needs. Basic principles have always been
taken forward, the common law has never been static. Lord Atkin "created" the tort of
negligence, by way of common law techniques, and a seemingly vague tort has served the
social and legal purpose admirably. It has been successfully applied to new situations.
Negligence is a far bigger tort than privacy would ever be. The judges have always
recognised that there must be limits to negligence, and that would apply also to a tort of
privacy. All tort is a balancing exercise between competing interests. The need in the
public interest to balance privacy and freedom of expression would always be recognised.
Definition of a tort of privacy would not be easy, but the draftsmen of the European
Convention on Human Rights (draftsmen who included Englishmen) managed to draft
article 8 over fifty years ago and the draft has stood the test of time, is applied daily, and
indeed is incorporated into English law.
Article 8 expressly creates the right of privacy, qualified of course, in European human
rights law. Why should that remedy not be directly available in the United Kingdom
instead of the citizen having to go to Strasbourg to obtain judgement to compel the
government to provide an appropriate remedy?
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The fact that Parliament has not created a statutory tort of invasion of privacy may just
possibly be because Parliament does not want to see such a remedy. However the United
Kingdom is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, and has partially
incorporated it into domestic legislation. The failure to legislate is probably, indeed very
likely, because government has higher political priorities for legislation.
The House of Lords has missed a golden opportunity. Lord Atkin would not have missed
such an opportunity.
Alec Samuels, JP
Barrister
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